We are interested in incentivizing experimental subjects to report their beliefs truthfully, without imposing assumptions on their risk preferences. We prove that if subjects are not risk neutral, it is not possible to elicit subjective probabilities or the mean of a subjective probability distribution truthfully using deterministic payments schemes, which are predominant in the literature. We present a simple randomization trick that transforms deterministic rewards into randomized rewards, such that agents with arbitrary risk preferences report as if they were risk neutral. Using this trick, we show how to elicit probabilities, means, medians, variances and covariances of the underlying distribution without assuming risk neutrality.
Introduction
The economic literature on the elicitation of an expert's subjective beliefs has focused on so-called proper scoring rules. These mechanisms, which are used in many economic experiments, reward the expert on the basis of post-elicitation events such that it is in the expert's interest to report her true beliefs if she is risk neutral. The quadratic scoring rule (QSR) [1] is the most popular rule, used to elicit the probability of an event or the mean of a random variable. In the absence of risk neutrality, there is an incentive to report conservative beliefs in order to avoid large losses [2] . This is a problem, since risk neutrality is shown to be widely violated in experimental studies [e.g. 3]. Indeed, Armantier and Treich [4] show experimentally that consistent with risk aversion, elicitation with the quadratic scoring rule leads to conservative bias in reported beliefs.
There are different ways to get around this problem. Offerman et al. [5] propose a way to correct for deviations of risk neutrality and expected utility, by quantifying the size of deviations for each individual. Alternatively, an earlier literature starting with Smith [6] 1 shows how one can induce risk neutrality by rewarding subjects using binary lottery tickets. This idea has been used to show how to elicit the subjective probability of an event [e.g. 10,11] in a way similar to the elicitation of a reservation price [12] .
We extend this literature in several ways. First, we prove that deterministic schemes are not adequate if one does not know the risk preferences of the expert. Second, we combine the literature on scoring rules for risk neutral preferences with the literature on incentivizing with lottery tickets to show that one can elicit a median or any quantile without making assumptions on risk preferences. We also present an alternative way to elicit a probability or mean based on the randomized quadratic scoring rule. Third, we present a new deterministic rule, and its randomized counterpart, to elicit variances and covariances when two independent observations are available.
Preliminaries
We consider two people, an expert and an elicitor. The expert has subjective beliefs about the distribution X F of a bounded random variable X that yields outcomes belonging to
with . The expert maximizes expected utility for some utility function on such that 
Limitations of Deterministic Rewards
t the Consider an elicitor who wishes either to learn abou mean of some random variable X with support in  , or about probability of some ev t C   . We obtain the following result. Proposition 1. A scoring rule with a deterministic re en ward cannot elicit the probability
The proof is in the Appendix. The i ple. Th ntuition is sim e elicitor has only one parameter, the realization x , to incentivize the expert to tell the truth. On the oth r hand, there are two dimensions of uncertainty as the
and . u
Probabilistic Elicitation
We now consider elicitation using probabilistic or randomized reward functions. The idea, first elaborated by Smith [6] , is that one pays the experts in lottery tickets rather than money. The size of the prize is given by the probability of winning the lottery. Hence   We use the following "randomization trick" to transform deterministic into probabilistic payoffs. First, given a deterministic reward function g , determine A and B such that
y from w a realization bution on   Formally t , we replace he deterministic reward   , g z x by the randomized reward 
The expected utility of the expert equals an affine transformation of   , g z x . Thus, a report that maximizes her expected utility is a report that maximizes the utility of a risk neutral expert and vice versa. In particular, [16] ) presents a simple reward function where a prize is rewarded with some probability that depends on the draw of two uniformly distributed random variables. Allen [11] presents an alternative rule that relies on a draw of a random variable that has a more complex probability distribution. Mclvey and Page [17] uses a randomized version of the quadratic scoring rule in an experimental application, which is similar to the rule we present below.
Eliciting Probabilities
The QSR (for the event X C  ) is given by Note that the expected payoffs under rQSR are ide ntical to those under the rules of Allen [11] and McKelvey and Page [17] when 1 M  .
Eliciting the Mean
To elicit the mean, we combine the randomization trick with the fact that the QSR [14] considers a version of the rQSR (see below), which they call the Binary Lottery Procedure. Both papers also consider non-expected utility theory.
Proposition 3. The randomized quadratic scoring rule el and Quantiles
Cervera and Munoz [18] icits EX .
Median
The quantile scoring rule, due to is a strictly proper scoring rule for the quantile  of the In particular, Proposition 4 shows how to elicit the median by setting 1 2   .
Variance and Covariance
In order to elicit the variance of X F en we assume the elicitor can condition on two independ t realizations 1 x and 2
x of X when rewarding the expert. So we co der a ward nction   We have rigorousl scoring rules for belief elicitation. To overcome those limitations, we applied the idea of paying in lottery tickets to transform known deterministic scoring rules for belief elicitation, such as the well-known QSR, into randomized rules. These rules provide agents with incentives to truthfully report parameters of a subjective probability distribution for all risk preferences, and can be used in experimental applications. This paper has considered the theo pirical side, it is an open question whether these rules have the desired properties in actual applications, and how they are best presented to subjects. Selten et al. [19, see also review therein] raises doubt whether subjects rewarded using lotteries behave as if risk neutral in experiments. More recently, Harrison et al. [14, 20] , and Hossain and Okui [13] provide evidence that the produre can induce subjects to behave more in line with risk neutrality. 
